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Abstract
The Australian Government introduced a resource rent tax on offshore oil and gas deposits in 1987 and
since then it has raised in excess of an additional $1 billion a year in revenue over and above the normal
company tax on income. At the time it was being introduced a great deal of controversy followed the
proposed introduction of the petroleum resource rent tax (PRRT). On 2 November 2011, the Australian
government introduced the raft of bills into Parliament for the imposition of a Mineral Resource Rent Tax
(MRRT) on profit generated from iron ore, coal and gas from coal seams from 1 July 2012. Onshore oil
and gas deposits will now be subject to a rent tax under the new PRRT regime that was also introduced
into Parliament on 2 November 2011. The proposed MRRT has been met with criticism from certain
mining companies, the Opposition parliamentary parties and noted economists. However, Australia
currently has a budget deficit and a MRRT is being viewed by the government as being a solution to
repaying government debt and to redistribute the burden of tax by reducing the rate at which companies
pay income tax. A Resource Rent Tax (RRT) has been used by a number of countries such as the United
Kingdom and Norway to increase government revenue from their 'North Sea' oil reserves. This paper will
address the question raised above: namely, why is there opposition to a proposed MRRT given the
continued existence of a PRRT in Australia for over 14 years? The paper will also contend that there are
sound philosophical reasons for having this form of taxation and that as a result of the continued
existence of a PRRT in Australia together with the fact that resource rent taxes have been adopted in
many other countries, that the criticism of the new MRRT is unwarranted.
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GIVEN THE FACT THAT AUSTRALIA HAS HAD A ‘PETROLEUM RESOURCE RENT
TAX’ SINCE 1987, WHY SHOULD THERE BE ANY OPPOSITION TO A ‘MINERAL
RESOURCE RENT TAX’?
JOHN MCLAREN AND PIERRE CHABAL
ABSTRACT
The Australian Government introduced a resource rent tax on offshore oil and gas
deposits in 1987 and since then it has raised in excess of an additional $1 billion a year
in revenue over and above the normal company tax on income. At the time it was being
introduced a great deal of controversy followed the proposed introduction of the
petroleum resource rent tax (PRRT). On 2 November 2011, the Australian government
introduced the raft of bills into Parliament for the imposition of a Mineral Resource Rent
Tax (MRRT) on profit generated from iron ore, coal and gas from coal seams from 1 July
2012. Onshore oil and gas deposits will now be subject to a rent tax under the new
PRRT regime that was also introduced into Parliament on 2 November 2011. The
proposed MRRT has been met with criticism from certain mining companies, the
Opposition parliamentary parties and noted economists. However, Australia currently
has a budget deficit and a MRRT is being viewed by the government as being a solution
to repaying government debt and to redistribute the burden of tax by reducing the rate
at which companies pay income tax. A Resource Rent Tax (RRT) has been used by a
number of countries such as the United Kingdom and Norway to increase government
revenue from their ‘North Sea’ oil reserves. This paper will address the question raised
above: namely, why is there opposition to a proposed MRRT given the continued
existence of a PRRT in Australia for over 14 years? The paper will also contend that
there are sound philosophical reasons for having this form of taxation and that as a
result of the continued existence of a PRRT in Australia together with the fact that
resource rent taxes have been adopted in many other countries, that the criticism of the
new MRRT is unwarranted.



Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Canberra and Associate Professor, University of Le
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I INTRODUCTION
The paper will start with a discussion of the political implications that followed from the
proposal of the Australian Government to introduce a MRRT. This will be followed by an
examination of the current resource rent tax regimes in use by different governments in
other countries. This examination of the existing resource rent taxes that are being
imposed in other countries is limited in its scope but it is included in this paper to
illustrate the fact that resource rent taxes have been accepted by mining companies in
other jurisdictions for many years. From this perspective, it will be contended that the
opposition to a MRRT by the mining companies in Australia is grossly hypocritical given
the fact that this form of taxation is accepted globally. The second part of the paper will
commence with a discussion of the philosophical basis for the imposition of an extra tax
on the cash flow profit from minerals. This part of the paper will examine the current
PRRT and the new PRRT Bill as well as a discussion of the final MRRT Bill that was
introduced into the Australian Parliament on 2 November 2011. The third part of the
paper will then critically examine the criticisms from various parties to the MRRT in
order to determine whether or not these purported defects in the tax have merit and
should be taken into account by the government. Finally, the conclusion will provide an
answer as to the merit of the various criticisms and a prognosis as to the future of
mineral taxes in Australia.
The renewed interest in a resource rent tax on mining was the initiative of Dr Ken
Henry and the members of the review into ‘Australia’s Future Tax System’, now
commonly referred to as the ‘Henry Review’.1 The review recommended the
introduction of a resource rent tax for all mineral and petroleum resources except
brown coal.2 In the final report, Henry contended that the royalty system, which allows
the states to collect revenue based on the value of the resource being sold and the
volume of output, should be replaced by a resource rent tax.3 As a result of this review,
the Government announced on 2 May 2010 that they would introduce a ‘Resource Super
Profits Tax’ on mining to not only generate additional revenue but compensate a
reduction in the rate of company tax to ultimately 28 percent. The Government also
proposed that there would be an increase in the Superannuation Guarantee Charge to
12 percent and finally to provide funds for an investment in infrastructure that would
benefit future generations of Australian residents.4
The super profits tax was set at a rate of 40 percent and was to apply from 1 July 2011.5
However, as a result of a campaign against the tax by the mining industry, the
Opposition Party in Parliament and public opinion, the incumbent Prime Minister Kevin
Rudd was replaced by Julia Gillard on 24 June 2010.

Australia’s Future Tax System Review Panel (K Henry (Chair), J Harmer, J Piggott, H Ridout and G Smith),
Australia’s Future Tax System: Report to the Treasurer (December 2009) (AFTS Report).
2 Ibid 217.
3 Ibid.
4 The Treasurer, Wayne Swan, ‘Stronger, Fairer, Simpler: A Tax Plan for our Future’ (Press Release, No.
028, 2 May 2010),
http://www.treasurer.gov.au/DisplayDocs.aspx?doc=pressreleases/2010/028.htm&pageID=003&min=
wms&Year=2010&DocType=0
5 Ibid.
1
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The new Prime Minister, Julia Gillard then negotiated a new form of resource rent tax to
be applied to mining companies extracting iron ore, coal and coal seam gas only. The
end result was a new ‘Minerals Resource Rent Tax Bill’ (MRRT) and Exposure Draft that
was released for public comment on 18 September 2011. Prior to this happening, the
Australian Government had formed a ‘Policy Transition Group’ made up of resource
sector, government and taxation experts to provide advice on the design and
implementation of a MRRT.6 On 24 March 2011, the Policy Transition Group reported to
the Government on its findings. The Government accepted all 98 recommendations of
the Policy Transition Group, led by Resources Minister Martin Ferguson and Mr. Don
Argus AC, relating to the new resource tax arrangements. The recommendations form
the basis of the second draft MRRT legislation. Consultation on the exposure draft
closed on 5 October 2011.
A The MRRT System
The final raft of legislation creating the MRRT and amending the PRRT was introduced
into Parliament on 2 November 2011.7 The object of the MRRT Bill is stated in section 1‐
10 as follows:
The object of this Act is to ensure that the Australian community receives an adequate
return for its taxable resources, having regard to:
a) the inherent value of the resources; and
b) the non‐renewable nature of the resources; and
c) the extent to which the resources are subject to Commonwealth, State and Territory
royalties.
This Act does this by taxing above normal profits made by miners (also known as
economic rents) that are reasonably attributable to the resources in the form and place
they were in when extracted.

A ‘taxable resource’ is defined in Division 20 of the Bill as coal, iron ore and coal seam
gas. The Government’s objective for the introduction of the MRRT legislation will be
discussed in Part II of the paper when the philosophical basis for a resource rent tax is
examined.
The MRRT is based on taxing projects, similar to the PRRT. Mining projects that do not
generate resource profits of more than AUD 50 million in a given year will not be
subject to the MRRT. This is designed to reduce the compliance costs for small mining
companies.8

Australian Government Policy Transitions Group, Issues Paper: Technical Design of the Minerals Resource
Rent Tax, Transitioning Existing Petroleum Projects to the Petroleum Resource Rent Tax and Policies to
Promote Exploration Expenditure, 1 October 2010.
7 Minerals Resource Rent Tax Bill 2011, Minerals Resource Rent Tax (Consequential Amendments and
Transitional Provisions) Bill 2011, Minerals Resource Rent Tax (Imposition–Customs) Bill 2011, Minerals
Resource Rent Tax (Imposition–Excise) Bill 2011, and Minerals Resource Rent Tax (Imposition–General)
Bill 2011 <www.aph.gov.au> at 3 November 2011.
8 Australian Government Policy Transitions Group, above n 6, 67.
6
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The MRRT is imposed at a rate of 30 percent and not 40 percent which is the current
rate of tax under the PRRT. The profit or loss calculation is based on the assessable
receipts less deductible expenditure less the uplift carry forward losses. The uplift
factor is the long term bond rate plus 7 percent.9
The MRRT will be a deductible expense when calculating taxable income for income tax
purposes. This is the current situation under the PRRT where the PRRT is a deduction
against assessable income pursuant to s 44‐750, Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth).
Royalties paid to the states and the Northern Territory will be credited against any
MRRT liability and any excess royalty payments will be uplifted and applied against
future MRRT liabilities. Any excess royalty payments will not be refundable.10 The
MRRT will only apply to iron ore, coal and petroleum projects. It will also apply to coal
seam methane or technologies that will convert coal into petroleum products. It will not
apply to other minerals.11 The MRRT will apply from 1 July 2012 but the market value of
assets acquired for projects after 1 May 2010 will be included in the expenditure
calculation for the MRRT.12
The Explanatory Memorandum provides the following outline and financial impact
summary of how the tax will operate:
The Minerals Resource Rent Tax (MRRT) is a tax on the economic rents miners make
from the taxable resources (iron ore, coal and some gases) after they are extracted from
the ground but before they undergo any significant processing or value add. ‘Economic
rent’ is the return in excess of what is needed to attract and retain factors of production
in the production process.
The MRRT is a project‐based tax, so a liability is worked out separately for each project
the miner has at the end of each MRRT year. The miner’s liability for that year is the sum
of those project liabilities. The tax is imposed on a miner’s mining profit, less its MRRT
allowances, at a rate of 22.5 per cent (that is, at a nominal rate of 30 per cent, less a one‐
quarter extraction allowance to recognise the miner’s employment of specialist skills).
A project’s mining profit is its mining revenue less its mining expenditure. If the
expenditure exceeds the revenue, the project has a mining loss. Mining revenue is, in
general, the part of what the miner sells its taxable resources for that is attributable to
the resources in the condition and location they were in just after extraction (the
‘valuation point’). Mining revenue also includes recoupments of some amounts that have
previously been allowed as mining expenditure.
Mining expenditure is the cost a miner incurs in bringing the taxable resources to the
valuation point. Mining allowances reduce each project’s mining profit. The most
significant of the allowances is for mining royalties the miner pays to the States and
Territories. It ensures that the royalties and the MRRT do not double tax the mining
profit. In the early years of the MRRT, the project’s starting base provides another
important allowance. The starting base is an amount to recognise the value of
investments the miner has made before the MRRT.
Ibid 8.
Ibid.
11 Ibid 11.
12 Ibid 95.
9

10
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Other allowances include losses the project made in earlier years and losses transferred
from the miner’s other projects (or from the projects of some associated entities). If a
miner’s total mining profit from all its projects comes to less than $50 million in a year,
there is a low‐profit offset that reduces the miner’s liability for MRRT to nil. The offset
phases out for mining profits totalling more than $50 million.
The MRRT is expected to generate revenue of $3.7 billion in 2012‐13; $4 billion in 2013‐
14; and $3.4 billion in 2014‐15.13

B Resource Rent Taxes in Other Countries
Many countries impose additional taxes on mining companies selling petroleum and
mineral resources that have been extracted from their land. Given this situation, why
then should there be reluctance on the part of mining companies to accept a MRRT in
Australia which will only apply to coal, iron ore and coal seam gas? The following
examination is very limited in its scope of the resource rent regimes adopted in other
countries but it does show that this form of taxation of mineral resources has been used
elsewhere, thus supporting the argument that it perhaps should not be subject to
criticism in Australia.
Many countries have imposed a resource rent tax on petroleum and mineral extraction
projects. Australia was one of the first countries to introduce a RRT in 1984, but Papua
New Guinea (PNG) had already introduced a RRT in 1977 on petroleum projects and
then in 1978, on mining projects. PNG subsequently removed the RRT in 2002 on
mining and introduced a progressive profits tax.14 In 1984, Ghana and Tanzania also
introduced a RRT.15 Since then, many countries have either contracted with mining
companies to impose a RRT on profit or legislated to impose the RRT. Russia introduced
a RRT in 1994; Kazakhstan in the mid‐1990s; Angola in 1996; British Columbia in
Canada in 1990; Namibia in 1993; and Timor‐Leste in 2006; to name just a few.16
Both the United Kingdom (UK) and Norway impose a resource rent tax on petroleum
profits derived from the North Sea on the ‘Continental Shelf’. The UK first introduced a
petroleum resource tax when the North Shelf was first developed in 1975. Since then it
has been amended and altered a number of times.17 The UK and Norway abolished
royalties based on the value of oil and gas extracted in 2002 and 1986 respectively.18
The reason given for abolishing royalties was that it was a regressive tax as it applied to
gross revenue and acted as a disincentive to exploration and production.19 The UK
applies a petroleum rent tax (PRT) at the rate of 50 percent as well as the normal
company income tax. Norway applies a special petroleum tax (SPT) at 50 percent and
the normal company tax on income.20 The UK government imposed a supplementary
Explanatory Memorandum, Mineral Resource Rent Tax Bill 2011 (Cth) 3.
J. Sarma and G Naresh, ‘Mineral Taxation around the World: Trends and Issues’ (2001) January, Asia
Pacific Tax Bulletin 2, 7.
15 Bryan Land, ‘Chapter 8‐Resources rent taxes’, in Philip Daniel, Michael Keen and Charles McPherson
(eds) The Taxation of Petroleum and Minerals: Principles, Problems and Practice(Routledge, 2010) 243
16 Ibid
17 Carole Nakhle, ‘Can the North Sea still save Europe?’ (2008) OPEC Energy Review 123, 134.
18 Ibid 133.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
13
14
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charge of a further 10 percent in 2002 and in 2005 increased the rate to 20 percent on
the company income. However, the PRT is deductible for income tax purposes. Norway
does not allow the SPT to be deductible for income tax purposes and the effective
marginal tax rate on the income of the company is 78 percent.21
The UK system is complicated by the fact that the PRT is based on the development of
the oil fields and especially those fields given development consent before 1993 and
those given consent after 1993. In the former case, fields that received permission
before 1993 are taxed on their income at a company tax rate of 50 percent and a PRT at
the rate of 50 percent whereas the later fields are subject only to a company tax rate of
50 percent.22 In 2002 the UK government introduced a 10 percent supplementary
charge on the same basis as company tax but there was no deduction for financing costs
against the supplementary charge.23 The royalty was abolished on older fields that had
received development consent before 1983 in an attempt to encourage fuller
exploitation of reserves from those fields.24 In 2005 in light of an increase in oil prices
the UK government doubled the supplementary charge to 20 percent.25 This means that
in the UK oil and gas is taxed at the highest rate of any industry: for fields given
approval after 1983, a company tax rate of 30 percent and the supplementary charge of
20 percent. For those fields given approval prior to 1983, the marginal rate of tax is 75
percent and they are also liable to company tax at the rate of 50 percent.26
Zambia nationalized its copper industry in 1964 but this was later repealed in 1985.
Since then the government has imposed a royalty rate of 3 percent, a variable income
tax rate and a windfall tax applied to the value of production. However, in 2009 the
windfall tax was repealed.27 A similar situation occurred in Chile, Bolivia, Peru,
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ghana and Jamaica where the mining industry was
nationalized.28 Some countries have subsequently privatized part of the mining industry
but the sovereign risk still remains. Chile now has a mixture of state participation and
private investment in the mining industry and has imposed a sliding scale of rates of
royalties based on the value of sales.29 Kazakhstan and Liberia have introduced a rent
based tax on the exploitation of their mineral resources.30
On 13 July 2010 the Australian Newspaper published a story that the Australian
government lobbied the Mongolian government, on behalf of Rio Tinto, to withdraw a
special income tax at the rate of 68 percent on mining profits.31 The Mongolian
Ibid,134.
Ibid.
23 Carole Nakhle, ‘Chapter 4‐ Petroleum fiscal regimes: evolution and challenges,’ in Philip Daniel, Michael
Keen and Charles McPherson (eds) The Taxation of Petroleum and Minerals: Principles, Problems and
Practice(Routledge, 2010) 111
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
27 Lindsay Hogan and Brenton Goldsworthy, Chapter 5, ‘International mineral taxation’, in Philip Daniel,
Michael Keen and Charles McPherson (eds) The Taxation of Petroleum and Minerals: Principles, Problems
and Practice(Routledge 2010) 122, 126.
28 Ibid 127.
29 Ibid 125.
30 Carole Nakhle, above n 23, 149.
31 Rowan Callick, ‘Canberra lobbied against tax’, The Australian (Sydney), 13 July 2010, 5.
21
22

25

Journal of the Australasian Tax Teachers Association 2011 Vol.6 No.1

government agreed to overturn the tax in October of 2010. The Mongolian government
will now take equity in the new mines in place of the increased income tax.32
Given the range of extra taxes that are imposed on mining and petroleum projects by
different nations, the introduction of a MRRT in Australia should not have created the
problem that it did. The fact that a PRRT has been in existence in Australia since 1988
should have provided comfort for the government that a resource rent tax would gain
acceptance by the mining companies.
II THE PHILOSOPHICAL BASIS FOR A RESOURCE RENT TAX
Mining companies pay income tax on their profits at the current rate of company tax.
Imposing a resource rent tax is an additional impost on the mining company. Therefore,
there must be a good reason why governments want to collect more revenue from
mining companies. Many countries, including Australia, have incurred large deficits in
their budgets as a result of introducing programs to stimulate their economies as a
result of the ‘Global Financial Crisis’. A resource rent tax is perceived as a means of
reducing the deficits.
The philosophical basis for the imposition of a rent tax is justified for three reasons:
first, that the minerals belong to the state and the rent tax is the price for extracting the
state owned assets; second, the collection of economic rents may result in a large
amount of revenue being collected without distorting production; and third, that mining
companies are very large and usually with foreign ownership and that from an equity
perspective a higher rate of tax could be justified.33 This view is reinforced by the
objective of the MRRT Bill as stated above. The objective also reinforces the fact that the
mineral resources are non‐renewable and the state has only one opportunity to
maximise its return for the Australian community. Each of these reasons for the
imposition of a resource rent tax will be examined in more detail below. However, prior
to discussing the reasons for the tax this paper will outline what is meant by an
‘economic rent’ and how this translates into a new form of taxation.
A What is ‘Economic Rent’ or a ‘Rent Tax’?
In this paper the terms ‘economic rent’ and ‘rent tax’ are given the same meaning as
they are used to describe the surplus value from the extraction of resources. One of the
best explanations of the concept of ‘economic rent’ in the mineral resource rent tax
context is the following definition provided by Professors Garnaut and Clunies Ross:
Economic rent is the excess of total revenue derived from some activity over the sum of
the supply prices of all capital, labour, and other ‘sacrificial’ inputs necessary to
undertake the activity. … In essence, it referred to the reward that a landowner could
derive by virtue simply of being a landowner and without exerting any effort or
making any sacrifice.34

Ibid.
Ross Garnaut and Anthony Clunies Ross, Taxation of Mineral Rents (Oxford University Press,1983) 18.
34 Ibid 26 and David Ricardo, The Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, (Everyman, 1962) chapter
2.
32
33
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Garnaut and Clunies Ross acknowledge that the definition is based on the work by
Ricardo.35 Adam Smith also examined the concept of economic rent in his treaties on
‘The Inquiry into the Wealth of Nations’ and contended that rent is an unearned surplus
which is appropriated by the landlords through the exercise of their monopoly power.36
Smith and Ricardo considered rent to be the unearned income obtained from renting
land to entrepreneurs who then grew crops or livestock. The entrepreneur took the risk
in buying seeds, planting the crop, harvesting the crop and finally selling the product.
The fact that the owner of the land had a monopoly and was able to extract a rent
without undertaking any activity or risk, caused political economists such as Smith to
develop the theoretical concept of taxing the economic rent of the landowner.37 A
similar situation arose with the owners of mines. The mine owners obtained a rent after
capital and labour costs were deducted from the price of the minerals that had been
sold. It is also acknowledged that a tax on the economic rent has a neutral effect on the
landowner or mine owner.38 A landowner or a mine owner would continue with their
activity even though their excess profit or economic rent was subject to tax. The costs of
capital and labour are already a factor in arriving at the economic rent.
A simple way of demonstrating the way in which economic rent is calculated is found in
the following formulation:
Economic rent = total revenue minus total economic cost39

A tax is then imposed on the amount of economic rent derived from the resource at a
specific rate. It is in effect a tax on the free cash flow from a resource project. It also
takes into account, in determining the costs of a project, the ‘opportunity costs of
capital’ by incorporating an uplift factor such as a long term bond rate plus a further
component.40 For example, with the PRRT in Australia the carry forward rate for
undeducted general project costs is the long term bond rate plus 5 percent. In the case
of the MRRT, the mining loss allowance is the long term bond rate plus 7 percent.
It must be noted that economic rents would not persist under standard competitive
conditions.41 In other words, if other mining companies entered the market because of
the attraction of the size of the economic rent, then the rates of return and supply of
minerals would drive the commodity price down or bid up the cost of fixed assets until
economic rents were eliminated.42 The economic rent is eliminated when commodity
prices fall or the extraction costs are too high. In order to overcome this type of
problem, many of the oil producing countries formed a cartel, namely the Organisation
Ibid 27.
Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Cause of the Wealth of Nations (Penguin Books 1970) 247.
37 Ibid 247, and David Ricardo, On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, (Everyman, 1962)
38 Joseph Keiper, Ernest Kurnow, Clifford Clark et al, Theory and Measurement of Rent (Chilton,1961), 14.
39 G. C. Watkins, ‘Atlantic Petroleum Royalties: Fair Deal or Raw Deal?’ (2001) Atlantic Institute for Market
Studies, The AIMS Oil and Gas Papers (2), 5.
40 Martin Van Brauman and Clifford Mangano, ‘Resource Rent Taxation as a Basis for Petroleum Tax
Policy by Foreign Governments and its Relationship to US Foreign Tax Credit Policy and Tax Law’ (2000)
18(1) Journal of Energy & Natural Resources Law 19, 20.
41 Michael Hinchy, Brian Fisher and Nancy Wallace, ‘Mineral Taxation and Risk in Australia, Discussion
Paper 89.8’, Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics (1989) 6.
42 Ibid.
35
36
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of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)43 as a means of controlling the price of
crude oil.
B State Ownership of Resources
If mineral resources are limited and owned by the state, then arguably a government
should make a contribution to the value of the state for future generations such as
infrastructure projects that have an enduring benefit. This way, future generations
derive some benefit from the wealth generated by former generations. This will not be
possible unless governments impose an additional tax on profits generated by mining
companies, either by virtue of increased mineral prices or having very profitable mines.
This view is also reinforced in section 1‐10 of the MRRT Bill as being the justification for
the introduction of the resource rent tax.
Mining companies are usually given an exclusive right to mine a particular lease. This
prevents wasteful over‐investment.44 An example of the problems that arise with a free‐
for‐all is found in the fishing industry where uncontrolled access leads to a dissipation
of the resource or a free‐for‐all with gold rushes.45 As Garnaut and Clunies Ross state, it
is difficult to put a price on a mining lease and therefore a resource rent tax is one way
in which the unknown value can be recouped by the state if the mine is economically
successful.46
The Commonwealth government and governments of the States of Australia own the
rights to minerals, not the registered proprietor of the land. The rights to mineral and
petroleum resources in the Australian Capital Territory reside with the Commonwealth
government by virtue of s 122 of the Australian Constitution. However, pursuant to the
Northern Territory (SelfGovernment) Act 1978 (Cth) the Territory Government has
jurisdiction over all minerals except uranium resources which are under the jurisdiction
of the Commonwealth Government.47 The Commonwealth Government is able to claim
the rights to mineral and petroleum resources located on or under Commonwealth land
and offshore locations in the territorial sea and continental shelf by virtue of the Seas
and Submerged Lands Act 1973 (Cth) and the Minerals (Submerged Lands) Act 1981
(Cth). All other mineral rights belong to the states.48 The states collect royalties from
mining companies based generally on the output of production at a particular price.
Dr Ken Henry and his review panel recommended the replacement of state based
royalties with a uniform resource rent tax collected by the Australian government. In
The Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) was founded in Baghdad, Iraq, with the
signing of an agreement in September 1960 by five countries namely Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq,
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela. They were to become the Founder Members of the Organization.
These countries were later joined by Qatar (1961), Indonesia (1962), Libya (new name yet to be
determined) (1962), the United Arab Emirates (1967), Algeria (1969), Nigeria (1971), Ecuador (1973),
Gabon (1975) and Angola (2007). From December 1992 until October 2007, Ecuador suspended its
membership. Gabon terminated its membership in 1995. Indonesia suspended its membership effective
January 2009. www.opec.org ,7 January 2011.
44 Garnaut and Clunies Ross, above n 33,19.
45 Ibid 20.
46 Ibid.
47Hinchy, Fisher and Wallace, above n 41, 32
48 For a detailed discussion of the rights to minerals and petroleum resources and the powers contained
in the Australian Constitution see: Michael Crommelin, ‘Governance of Oil and Gas Resources in the
Australian Federation’, (2009) University of Melbourne Law School, Research Series 8.
43
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turn the Australian government would negotiate the allocation of the revenue between
the state and territory governments.49 The Henry Review contended that by abolishing
royalties, mining companies would not have to comply with and administer two taxing
systems and that a resource rent tax would promote more efficient production.50
Professors Garnaut and Clunies Ross were also critical of the royalty system based on
the fact that it may tend to reduce the pace and extent of extraction with the result that
deposits are left in the ground where the unit costs of extraction rise.51
The State and Territory Governments charge mining companies a royalty on minerals
extracted within their boundary. In the 2007‐2008 year the amount of revenue
collected through State royalties was AUD 4.756 billion with Western Australia raising
52 percent of the revenue; Queensland 29 percent; and New South Wales 12 percent.
The other states only raised 7 percent of the revenue through royalties.52 However, as a
result of the ‘horizontal fiscal equalization process’ all states effectively share in the
revenue raised through the royalties because the Goods and Services Tax (GST)
revenue, which is collected by the Commonwealth government, is distributed in such a
way as to compensate those states that did not raise additional revenue through
resource royalties.53 In effect, Queensland and Western Australia, with all of their
mineral resources and royalties are not placed in any better financial position than the
other states that do not have a similar level of mineral and petroleum resources. On this
basis, why should the State Government of Western Australia oppose the abolition of
royalties and the introduction of a MRRT? The current MRRT Bill allows for the
retention of state royalties but with an allowance for royalties paid as an expense in
calculating the MRRT profit.54
It is not intended in this paper to examine the competing rights to the jurisdiction over
mineral and petroleum resources in Australia between the Commonwealth Government
and the State Governments. That may be an issue that is left to the High Court of
Australia to resolve in the future.
C Efficiency and Neutrality
An ideal taxation system does not impose impediments to the creation of value by
taxpayers. Income tax may be seen as not being tax neutral if the rates of tax act as an
impediment to generating more income. A rent tax is seen as being efficient and neutral
because it does not tax income. In fact the Australian government proposes to reduce
the rate of tax that a company pays on taxable income from 30 percent to 28 percent as
a direct result of introducing the MRRT. The following discussion from the perspective
of the individual provides a basic explanation of the concept of neutrality. While this
discussion directly relates to the effect of income tax on the individual it can also be
used to explain the concept of neutrality in the case of a resource rent tax. A resource
rent tax is said to be neutral because the existence of a MRRT does not affect decisions
on production, consumption, or trade.55
The Henry Review, above n 1, 240.
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51 Garnaut and Clunies Ross, above n 33, 93.
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54 Section 60‐10, MRRT Bill 2011.
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Ideally, any tax should be economically neutral for the taxpayer. In other words, the
existence of a tax at a particular rate should have no effect on the behaviour of the
taxpayer. The taxpayer should not change his or her behaviour as a result of taxation.
Graeme Cooper provides the following definition of the ‘optimal tax system’ as defined
by Mirrlees:
[A]n individual’s welfare is determined exclusively by utility derived from two items –
the amount that an individual consumes (C) and the amount of leisure the individual
enjoys (L). The individual’s welfare (U) is thus defined:
U = u(C,L) … [A] person’s total utility is a function of the individual utility of each of C
and L. Individuals will maximise their individual welfare by choosing the combination of
leisure and consumption that yields the highest outcome.56

Put simply, an individual can achieve their optimal happiness and welfare by either
working for more money or working less and having more leisure. If tax rates are too
high then the individual may choose to work less and enjoy more leisure. The problem
with this scenario is that the amount of tax collected is less and the tax system has
caused the individual to change their behaviour as a result of the tax rates. This is also
referred to as the ‘substitution effect’ of taxation when higher taxes lead to more
leisure.57 Joel Slemrod expresses his concern with any taxation that affects the
behavioural response of individuals and businesses to the tax system.58 He makes the
following observation in support of the optimal tax system:
[T]he more the tax system induces individuals and businesses to alter their behaviour,
the greater is the social cost of raising revenue. While, traditionally, economists have
focused on the behavioural response of labour supply, savings and investment –
sometimes called ‘real’ responses – in recent years the public finance community has
recognised that all the behavioural responses to taxation, including avoidance and
evasion, are all symptoms of inefficiency. According to this view, it is the responsiveness,
or elasticity, of taxable income that determines the social cost of collecting revenue. The
social cost, in turn, sets the trade‐off between fairness of the tax distribution and the
efficiency consequences of taxation, the trade‐off that frames the … appropriate level of
tax progressivity.59

The main issue for the design of a ‘good’ tax system appears to be how to provide an
answer to the following question; how is the burden of taxation to be spread across
society? Both the comprehensive and the optimal schools of taxation provide some
insight into an answer.60
The optimal tax system places emphasis on tax rates as opposed to the tax base.61 The
Haig‐Simons comprehensive approach to taxation of income placed emphasis on what
was going to be included in the definition of income tax, the tax base, whereas the
Graeme Cooper, ‘An Optimal or Comprehensive Income Tax?’ (1993‐1994) 22 Federal Law Review 414,
434.
57 Sinclair Davidson, ‘Are There Any Good Arguments Against Cutting Income Taxes?’ (2005) 69 CIS Policy
Monograph, The Centre for Independent Studies, 4
58 Joel Slemrod, ‘The Consequences of Taxation’ (2006) Social Philosophy & Policy Foundation’ 73, 73.
59 Ibid.
60 Cooper, above n 56, 422. This is the main issue facing any government designing a tax system and the
main question asked by Graeme Cooper in his paper.
61 Ibid 436.
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optimal tax school, based on the writings of Ramsey in 1927 and Mirrlees in 1971,62
places the emphasis on the rates of tax to be applied in order to maximise the utility of
the taxpayer. The reason why this was considered to be so important was that if equity
considerations were placed first then efficiency within the tax system is at risk.
Efficiency within a tax system is usually ‘defined in terms of deadweight loss’.63 A good
tax policy is one that causes less deadweight cost than another. Deadweight loss can
best be described as the cost associated with raising revenue through taxation. As
Sinclair Davidson observes in the following statement about deadweight losses:
[T]axes have two effects; first, they exist to raise revenue, and second, they generate
deadweight losses in the form of wealth that is not created as a result of the tax on
outputs. High marginal tax rates may therefore impede the revenue raising effects while
also imposing high deadweight losses on the economy. This means any changes in
marginal tax rates need to be evaluated in terms of the change in revenue and changes
in deadweight losses.64

A further example of where tax policy has had an impact on efficiency is found in the
study by the UK Open University Business School report, produced in 1998, on the
behaviour of companies in Britain where it was found that 18 percent of businesses
‘avoided sales to stay below the £50,000 threshold for VAT’.65
From the above analysis it can be seen that a rent tax does not have a distorting effect in
the way in which income tax does on the behaviour of the individual. A rent tax applies
to the free cash flow generated after all costs are deducted from the gross income and
before income tax is applied to the taxable profit. A rent tax is imposed on profits after
the mining company is compensated for a given rate of return on capital and labour
costs being deducted from sales of the minerals, in this case the long term bond rate
plus an uplift factor. The MRRT rate is incidental because the mining company has
already factored in a rate of return on their costs of production. From this perspective a
resource rent tax can be said to be tax neutral in terms of the above discussion on the
optimal tax and comprehensive tax systems.
D Resource Rent Tax and Equity
In order to understand the concept of equity in the context of a resources rent tax it is
helpful to examine the basic principle of equity in taxation. The following analysis is
based on income tax but the concepts are also applicable to a rent tax on resources in
Australia.
Put simply, the concept of equity in taxation is based on the perceived need to have
taxpayers contributing to revenue based on their ‘ability to pay’, as enunciated by Adam
Smith; or as expanded by J.S. Mill, the ‘equal sacrifice principle’. Those with more
Ibid 429. Graeme Cooper provides a detailed history of the development of the optimal tax system as
first enunciated by F. Ramsey in his paper on ‘A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation’ (1927) and the
adoption of this approach by Diamond and Mirrlees in 1971 with their paper titled ‘Optimal Taxation and
Public Production I: Production Efficiency’.
63 Terrance O’Reilly, ‘Principles of Efficient Tax Law: Apocrypha’ (2008) Virginia Tax Review 583, 585.
64 Davidson, above n 57, 13.
65 Binh Tran‐ Nam, ‘Tax Reform and Tax Simplification: Some Conceptual Issues and a Preliminary
Assessment’ (1999) Sydney Law Review 20, 31.
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income should pay more and those with less should pay less. The best advocate of
vertical and horizontal equity is Richard Musgrave. Musgrave states that Adam Smith
‘can be seen as an ability‐to‐pay theorist’ and with ‘a mix of benefit components’.66 In
other words, Smith viewed the payment of taxes as being in proportion to the benefits
being obtained from the State. According to Musgrave:
J.S. Mill then separated the analysis of tax equity from the expenditure side of the budget
… Mill then translated equal ability into equal sacrifice terms. Fairness, according to Mill,
required tax differentials which impose equal absolute sacrifice across unequal
incomes.67

Richard and Peggy Musgrave have taken these concepts further by arguing that
horizontal equity was linked to vertical equity. The following statement by Richard
Musgrave sums up the position perfectly:
The call for equity in taxation is generally taken to include a rule of horizontal equity
(HE), requiring equal treatment of equals, and one of vertical equity (VE), calling for an
appropriate differentiation among unequals. HE appears non‐controversial. Not only
does it offer protection against arbitrary discrimination but it also reflects the basic
principle of equal worth. The United States Constitution provides for ‘equal protection
under the law’.68

Musgrave acknowledges that ‘vertical equity … is inherently controversial. An
appropriate pattern of differentiation must be chosen but people will disagree on its
shape’.69 He goes on to hold that ‘horizontal equity appears non‐controversial’. This
view is endorsed by Henry Simons, of the Haig‐Simons definition of income, who states
that ‘it is generally agreed that taxes should bear similarly upon all people in similar
circumstances’.70 Professor Miller raises the question as to whether it is possible to
achieve equity in taxation and how it can be achieved.71 He contends that horizontal
equity is only achieved if all people are treated alike and if this does not occur then
people will cheat on their taxes.72 A rent tax is seen as potentially achieving horizontal
equity by being able to impose a tax based on a cash basis and not on the taxable income
generated by the mining company. Mining companies are generally multinational
enterprises and they have at their disposal the means of reducing taxable income by
using tax havens and engaging in transfer pricing.
From the above examination, it can be seen that taxes should be equally imposed on
those of equal means, horizontal equity, and that those of little means should be taxed
less than those of greater means, vertical equity. Applying this approach to a resource
rent tax, there are two aspects to consider. First, in developing countries where wages
are low, the citizens of that country obtain very little benefit from the mining activities
of large mining companies unless a resource rent tax is imposed or a similar
Richard Musgrave, ‘Horizontal Equity, Once More’ (1990) 43 National Tax Journal 113, 114.
Ibid 115.
68 Ibid 113.
69 Ibid.
70 Ibid.
71 John Miller, ‘Equal taxation: A Commentary’ (2000) 29 Hofstra Law Review 529, 531.
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arrangement that will generate additional revenue for the state. Second, if some
countries are endowed with mineral wealth should some of that wealth be shared with
less well‐off countries?
Professors Garnout and Clunies Ross have pointed out that the concept of equity applies
to future generations of a nation missing out on the benefits from infrastructure
projects that have been developed as a direct result of additional revenue being raised
through a resources rent tax. The main concern is that if the mineral wealth has been
mismanaged then those future generations have nothing to show for the lost wealth that
has been dissipated in the earlier years.73 The amount of wealth that has accrued to a
developing nation through employment opportunities is minimal and a resource rent
tax is vital in order to recoup additional wealth from the limited mineral resource.74
The second aspect of equity in this context relates to the suggestion that wealthy
nations with large quantities of mineral resources could consider sharing that wealth
with poorer nations.75 Moreover, Garnout and Clunies Ross suggest that poorer nations
with mineral resources may be given priority over wealthy nations in terms of the
sequence in which the former’s mineral resources are exploited before the later nations’
resources.76 This would, in their view, promote equity among nations. However, this
theory is predicated on the basis that all nations with resources impose a rent tax on the
mining companies.
E The Henry Report Approach to Taxing Mineral Resources
Dr Ken Henry examines the various options for taxing mineral and petroleum resources.
There are two versions of a resource rent tax (RRT) that are referred to in Chapter C of
the report as well as the literature on this area of taxation. The first version is a ‘Brown
Tax’ which is based on the work by the American economist, E Cary Brown and
published in 1948.77 The second version is what is known as the Garnaut and Clunies
Ross rent tax. Both versions of the rent tax are similar except the ‘brown tax’ requires
the state to recompense the mining company for expenses incurred in the exploration
and early production phases where there are negative cash flows. The payment
required by the state is equal to the product of the tax rate and the amount of the
negative cash flow. In other words, the mining project is paid compensation by the state
based on the losses incurred in the project up to that point. This would mean that
governments bear some of the risk of the project and this may be substantial with very
large projects that are non‐productive. In some instances it may create sovereign risk
for the state. The second version, the Garnaut and Clunies Ross model, is similar except
negative cash flows are carried forward until such time as the project becomes cash
positive. In order to compensate the project, the losses are carried forward with an
uplift factor such as the long term bond rate plus a percentage. For example, under the
PRRT in Australia, the uplift factor is the long term bond rate plus 15 percent for
Garnaut and Clunies Ross, above n 33, 21.
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exploration expenditure or 5 percent for project development and operating
expenditure. The Garnaut and Clunies Ross model has been accepted by the Australian
Government and this is acknowledged in the MRRT Explanatory Memorandum.78
F The Australian PRRT
In 1984 the Federal Government announced the introduction of a resource rent tax for
new offshore petroleum projects and that the projects would be exempt from the
imposition of royalties and the crude oil levy.79 It was a further three years before the
legislation was finally passed by parliament. The federal government was not able to
extend the rent tax to onshore petroleum production in lieu of state royalties because
the state governments of Western Australian and Queensland objected.80 In 1990, Bass
Strait petroleum projects became subject to the PRRT.81 The North West Shelf projects
are subject to a federal royalty and the crude oil levy.82
The Act was effective from 15 January 1984, even though the legislation was not passed
by Parliament until 1987. The Act applied retrospectively to exploration permits
awarded on or after 1 July 1984 and recognised expenditure incurred on or after 1 July
1979. It was originally imposed on offshore petroleum projects other than Bass Strait
and the North West Shelf. However, oil and gas production in Bass Strait moved from a
royalty and excise regime to the PRRT regime in the fiscal year 1990‐1991. The PRRT
was imposed on oil companies with the enactment of the Petroleum Resource Rent Tax
Act 1987 (Cth) and the Petroleum Resource Rent Tax Assessment Act 1987 (Cth). The
resource rent tax is imposed on the taxable profit of a petroleum project that is located
‘offshore’ in Australia. The Hawke Labor Government of 1984 introduced a resource
rent tax, based on the Garnaut and Clunies Ross model, in order to remedy the state‐
based taxation system of imposing royalties on resource production output.83 The
Petroleum Resource Rent Tax Act 1987 (Cth) is imposed on the profit at the rate of 40
percent. The Petroleum Resource Rent Tax Assessment Act 1987 (Cth) contains the
provisions relating to the calculation of the profit subject to the rent tax. The PRRT
raised in excess of an additional $1 billion a year in revenue over and above the normal
company tax on income84
III OPPOSITION TO THE MRRT
This part of the paper will examine the different arguments that have been proposed in
opposition to the MRRT in Australia. On 2 May 2010 as part of the ‘Budget’
announcement the Australian government first introduced the concept of a ‘resource
super profits tax’ on mining based in part on the recommendation of the Henry Review.
This concept was met with powerful negative responses from businesses in the
Explanatory Memorandum, MRRT Bill (2011) 8.
Crommelin, as above n 48, 12.
80 Ibid 13.
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83 Rob Fraser, ‘The state of resource taxation in Australia: “An inexcusable folly for the nation?”’ (1999)
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84 Australian Taxation Office statistics – 2002‐03 = $1.2 billion; 2003‐04 = $1.5 billion; 2004‐05 = $2.0
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resources sector.85 Since that initial announcement of a ‘super profits tax’ a new Prime
Minister was appointed; a Federal election has taken place in Australia; and the final
MRRT Bill was introduced into Parliament on 2 November 2011. There is still some
doubt that the Bill will pass the House of Representatives as one of the independent
members, Tony Windsor MP is opposed to coal seam gas exploration on farming land.86
The Australian Government would need his support in Parliament to pass the Bill.
A Opposition by Economists
Professor John Freebairn contends that the reforms proposed by Ken Henry would
improve taxation efficiency. He finds that there are three areas that from a practical
perspective need to be resolved. First, how do you treat existing mines in terms of
future tax treatment and deductions for past expenditure; second, sovereign risk
associated with a rent tax in place of royalties; and third, the problems that may arise
between the State governments and the Commonwealth government over the
ownership of resources in Australia.87 Many of these initial concerns have been resolved
by the fact that State royalties will still be charged by the State Governments. Similarly,
the problem of ownership of mineral resources appears to have been resolved by
allowing for royalties to be charged. Clearly some residual issues remain with the
accounting treatment of past expenditure.
Professor Henry Ergas is opposed to a MRRT on the basis that it is an inefficient tax and
may raise much less revenue than claimed by the government.88 He also raises some
other important issues in opposition to the proposed MRRT and these issues may need
serious consideration by the government in the future. He contends that future
investment in iron ore and coal projects may become less attractive because of the
MRRT and investment may shift to other resources not subject to the tax.89 Professor
Ergas also contends that the MRRT retains the inefficiencies of the royalty system and
the inefficiencies of a rent tax.90 The MRRT is inefficient because it discourages
investment in high risk projects while leaving unchanged the viability of low‐risk
projects.91
Professor Guj contends that the MRRT is not competitively neutral in that existing large
mining companies will pay less MRRT compared with small to mid‐tiered producers.
The reason for this is that the existing mining companies are able to value pre ‐ 2 May
2010 projects at market value for their starting base allowance which will increase their
deductions from the sale price of their minerals and gas.92
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Clearly there will be teething problems with the introduction of the MRRT. However, the
taxing provisions are similar to the existing PRRT and that system appeared to be
acceptable for oil companies for over 14 years.
B Political Opposition
The Leader of the Opposition party in the Australian Parliament, Tony Abbott MP claims
that imposing a MRRT on mining companies was ‘an economic version of the tall poppy
syndrome’.93 He maintains that it is sufficient for mining companies to pay income tax
and that their employees pay personal income tax and as miners, they pay state
royalties.94 He was therefore of the view that no more taxes should be imposed on
mining unless there is some unique feature.95 This attitude to a proposed MRRT is quite
remarkable given that many foreign countries impose additional taxes on mining
companies on the basis that the mineral resources are finite and that the additional
revenue may provide benefits for future generations. It is even more remarkable given
that the Howard Government was in power in Australia for 14 years and at no time
considered revoking the PRRT which was adding at least one billion dollars to
government revenue.
C Mining Company Opposition
Mining companies naturally opposed the MRRT because they will now be required to
contribute a greater share of their taxable profit to the Australian government if they
are involved in the sale of iron ore, coal or petroleum products. The MRRT is imposed
on a miner’s mining profit, less its MRRT allowances, at a rate of 22.5 per cent. That is at
a nominal rate of 30 per cent, less a one‐quarter extraction allowance to recognise the
miner’s employment of specialist skills. The mining company will pay company tax on
the taxable income at the rate of 28 percent, giving an overall effective tax rate of 50.5
percent. The three largest mining companies, namely BHP, Rio Tinto and Xstrata have
accepted the current MRRT and are prepared to pay the tax. The executive chairman of
Fortescue Metals Group, Mr Andrew Forrest still opposes the tax but contends that his
company will avoid paying the MRRT for at least five years due to the starting base
allowances reducing their profits.96 He also contends that the big mining companies
such as BHP, Rio Tinto and Xstrata are in a similar position and will not pay the MRRT
for many years.97 Mr Forrest contends that the Government has overestimated the
amount of revenue that will be collected and therefore should scrap the tax.98
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IV CONCLUSION
Australia has had a resource rent tax on petroleum projects under the existing PRRT
regime. It would appear that the Australian government should succeed in having a
MRRT imposed on iron ore and coal projects from 1 July 2012 provided the Bill passes
the House of Representatives with the assistance of the independent members of
Parliament. The design and implementation of the MRRT is on similar lines to the PRRT
which has raised additional revenue over the past 14 years. However, according to
some economists there are issues that still need to be resolved in the practical
application of the MRRT to various mining companies, especially small to medium
explorers. The mining industry naturally opposed the introduction of a MRRT as it
would result in a greater share of its taxable profit being paid to the Australian
government. In fact with a 22.5 percent MRRT and a company tax rate of 28 percent, the
total tax take represents about 50.5 percent, clearly well below that amount being
claimed by other countries, in particular the UK from petroleum projects based in the
North Sea.
Future generations of Australian taxpayers will eventually judge the manner in which
the non‐renewable mineral resources have been exploited and the return that was
extracted for the benefit of all Australians. Given that most resource rich countries have
been extracting additional revenue from mining companies, the proposed MRRT in
Australia is clearly defensible. This then answers the question raised in this paper:
namely, why the concern about a proposed MRRT? The answer must be that there is no
need for concern as the PRRT has been raising additional revenue for over 14 years and
other countries have been imposing a similar tax for many years without an apparent
adverse impact on the mining industry.
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